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This rapid literature review presents the key literature on border disputes and micro-conflicts in 
South and Southeast Asia. The focus is on recent ideas that are prevalent in literature from post-
2010. The literature review draws on both academic and grey literature. 
The report finds that conflicts have become more complex and protracted often linked to global 
challenges from climate change to human trafficking. Such challenges often intersect with 
complex socio-cultural, economic, and political dimensions that operate through power networks 
which transcend conventional conceptual boundaries, e.g. public vs. private or local vs. national. 
Border regions are often identified as locations in which latent conflict is located, driven by a 
range of intersecting factors including (though not limited to), the unresolved tensions of 
colonialism, unclear or contested border demarcations, the historically porous nature of border 
regions, contestation over natural resources and the “less-” or “un”-governed nature of many 
such areas. Subnational conflicts with strong trans-border dimensions are the most widespread 
and enduring forms of conflict in South and Southeast Asia, affecting half the countries of the 
region.  
Territorial disputes in Asia remain a challenge to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region. 
Of all interstate disputes, those over territory tend to be more likely to lead to armed conflict. A 
mix of political and economic interests, normative reasons, and competition over scarce natural 
resources have been identified as drivers of conflict over disputed territories. Such disputes vary 
greatly in terms of their origins, the scope of the territory in question and the role these disputes 
play in the bilateral or multilateral relations of the states involved. There are numerous ways 
territorial disputes can be categorised. Brunet-Jailly (2015) present three categories of border 
disputes: territorial, positional and functional. According to this typology:  
• Territorial disputes are about land. They are the most complex ones as they undermine 
the integrity of states.  
• Positional disputes arise when the parties agree in principle on a border but cannot agree 
on the position of the boundary line.  
• Functional disputes are neither about territory nor the borderline but about competing 
understandings of the function that a certain border should perform.  
Contestation over natural resources has often been included in such typologies.  
Regional conflict systems are often characterised by their complexity; involving numerous actors, 
causes, structural conditions and dynamics. Such complexity poses difficulties to those looking to 
undertake analysis of the regional dynamics of violence. It is also unclear how violence diffuses 
in regions and under which conditions a regional conflict system can emerge. It is also unclear 
who the key actors are in any given border dispute, how they engage with one another and the 
extent to which they influence the nature and extent of conflict. 
The list of disputes presented in this report should be considered illustrative rather than 
exhaustive, selected to provide an insight into the multifaceted drivers of dispute and conflict. 
They are selected to highlight how relatively localised disputes can become global in scope as 
they intersect with contestations over political or economic power, are inflamed by political actors 
keen to exploit local grievances or exacerbated by resource scarcity. Many of the disputes 
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examined can be traced to the process of decolonisation and the various regional and domestic 
struggles that ensued. Despite the regional and global transformations that followed, these 
disputes continue to play an important role in relations between countries. Indeed historical 
contestations continue to be inscribed with new meaning as circumstances evolve. 
Thailand / Cambodia Dispute(s): While the dispute between Thailand and Cambodia does 
have its roots in the colonial period of the region, the most important factor that led to the 
escalation of the dispute in 2008 and the subsequent clashes was domestic politics in Thailand. 
India / Pakistan Dispute(s) - Jammu and Kashmir: The origins of this dispute can be traced to 
the legacy of the British colonial rule in India and the nature of the British departure from the 
Indian subcontinent in 1947–8. Tensions in the Indo-Pak border can also be exacerbated be 
competition over resources, for example, tensions between India and Pakistan have risen from 
over the Baglihar dam construction over River Chenab in Indian-administered Kashmir. 
India / China Dispute(s): Contemporary India / Chinese relationship are largely cordial and a 
key factors in regional stability. After the 1987 incident, relations between the two Asian giants 
transformed into a cold peace and while both sides officially maintain their territorial claims, whilst 
accepting the status quo. 
Nepal / India Dispute: Despite predominantly cordial relations there are times when border 
issues have taken a critical turn. One such recent border-related problem between India and 
Nepal was witnessed during the Madheshi movement. In 2015, an agitating section of the 
Madheshi community in Nepal blocked the India–Nepal border. Due to the sociocultural proximity 
of Madheshi community with India, the blockade of the Indo-Nepal border has had repercussions 
for bilateral ties. 
Bangladesh / India Dispute(s): The India–Bangladesh border is the fifth largest land border in 
the world measuring circa 4096.7 km. The India–Bangladesh border is viewed as a ‘security 
concern’ by New Delhi, and has sought to securitise the border with Bangladesh viewing with 
concern the porous nature of the border making it accessible to the militant groups and 
smugglers 
Bangladesh / Myanmar Dispute(s): The influence of geopolitics is evident in border disputes 
between Myanmar and Bangladesh. Myanmar occupies a strategic location bordering China and 
India, and connected with the Indian Ocean through the Bay of Bengal. Criminality has also 
emerged as a significant issue in the region with Myanmar emerging as a significant hub for the 
production and distribution of methamphetamine and its derivatives. 
South China Sea Maritime Disputes: The territorial and maritime disputes in the South China 
Sea are considered some of the most complex conflicts in the region if not worldwide (Bukh, 
2020). The disputed areas are abundant in natural resources such as gas and oil and also carry 
strategic importance, as roughly half of the world’s commercial shipping passes through them. 
These disputes play an important role not only in the relations among the claimants but also the 
foreign policies of countries such as Japan and the United States. The disputes involve 
overlapping maritime, territorial and fishing rights and claims by China, Taiwan, Brunei, the 
Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia. 
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2. Border Disputes and Micro-Conflicts 
Contemporary conflicts have become more complex and protracted. About 2 billion people, circa 
a third of the world’s population, currently live in countries affected by conflict. Conflict is often 
linked to global challenges from climate change to human trafficking. According to the Social 
Science Research Council (2018: 3), “conflicts and widespread violence have complex socio-
cultural, economic, and political dimensions that operate through power networks which 
transcend conventional conceptual boundaries, e.g. public vs. private or local vs. national. 
It is a commonly held view (Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2018; Szayna et al., 2017; 
Krause, 2016) that the nature, intensity, and frequency of conflict have evolved in recent years, 
shifting from wars fought directly between states to various forms of violence, including 
insurgencies, guerrilla wars, terrorism, organised and large-scale criminal violence, and protests. 
This broadly positive trend in the “successful” reduction of conflict at national levels often masks 
sub-national and cross border pockets of latent, simmering or protracted conflict (Mancini, 2018; 
Weigand, 2020; Goodhand, 2018).  
Border regions are often identified as locations in which latent conflict is located, driven by a 
range of intersecting factors including (though not limited to), the unresolved tensions of 
colonialism, unclear or contested border demarcations, the historically porous nature of border 
regions, contestation over natural resources and the “less-” or “un-”governed nature of many 
such areas. Goodhand (2018: 3) comments that subnational conflicts with strong trans-border 
dimensions are the most widespread and enduring forms of conflict in South and Southeast Asia, 
affecting half the countries of the region. He continues that: 
• Border and frontier regions are frequently central to the dynamics of conflict, state 
building and development.  
• Policy makers tend to view border regions as marginal, partly because of state-centric 
analytic frameworks and ways of working, and partly because of the failure to translate a 
‘borderland perspective’ into operationalisable policies.  
• Taking border regions seriously would challenge mainstream approaches and 
necessitate significant changes to development and peacebuilding policy/practice. 
Territorial disputes in Asia remain a serious challenge to the peace, stability, and prosperity of 
the region. Of all interstate disputes, those over territory tend to be more likely to lead to armed 
conflict. A mix of political and economic interests, normative reasons, and competition over 
scarce natural resources have been identified as drivers of conflict over disputed territories 
(Mancini, 2013: 1). 
Terminology 
Numerous terms and phrases are deployed in the exploration of areas on the margins of nation 
state and to examine and explain the nature of conflict in these areas. Terms commonly used 
include borders, boundaries, borderlands and frontiers. There is no agreed use of these terms 
and they are often used interchangeably.  
Borders and the lands they encompass are typically understood as zones straddling an 
international border. Borders are commonly considered to concern how rulers and governments 
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control people’s freedom of movement (Laine, 2016). Borders are lines of demarcation between 
two states, legally notifying the territorial limits.  
Drawing boundaries between countries is politically sensitive, especially when governments or 
groups of people have a particular stake in a geographic area. Historically, the practice of 
drawing borders ignored ethnic, religious, social, or linguistic identities. Further to this, 
inappropriate boundary descriptions are at the root of many disputes (Goodhand, 2018; Laine, 
2016; O’Dowd, 2012). Common issues accompanying the inappropriate use of boundary 
descriptions include: 
• inappropriate topographical terms, such as crest, range, and mouth. These are all vague 
terms and indicate locations that at times vary due to geological or hydrological changes; 
• vague geographical features; 
• intricate human and cultural features (Indonesia, for example, includes over 300 ethnic 
groups, with different languages and cultures. The country has experienced many 
territorial disputes, both within its populace and with neighbouring countries); 
• inconsistent or contradictory statements. Article 56 of the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), for example, outlines parameters for the establishment of a country’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which extend 200 nautical miles from the country’s 
coastline. This has created the possibility of overlapping claims in semi-enclosed seas. 
This ambiguity complicates defining the numerous claims in the East and South China 
Seas, which is today one of the main sources of tensions hampering peaceful relations in 
East and Southeast Asia. 
Frontiers are vaguer and more ambiguous political spaces, marking zones of transition between 
different centres of power and regulation (Goodhand, 2018). Frontiers can be seen as ideological 
projects, spaces where state power is territorialised and contested with specific characteristics of 
violence and disorder. It is frequently assumed that frontiers are transformed during state 
building processes into international borders (O’Dowd, 2012: 159). Conflict in South and South-
East Asia provide an exemplar of the tensions that can be unleashed as historically porous 
frontiers are converted into borders via legal definition and the deployment of infrastructure.  
Finally, it is also important to note that there is no single, agreed-upon definition of what 
constitutes violent conflict or how this may manifest in disputed border regions. The term violent 
conflict may refer to civil war, ethnic war, and interstate war at high and low intensities as well as 
violence that falls short of war, such as militarised disputes, terrorism, and riots or strikes 
(Szayna et al., 2017). It is also important to note that trends and drivers of conflict will intersect in 
complex ways, particularly in areas where governance arrangements may be weak or uncertain 
(Kett, & Rowson, 2007). Indeed, whilst the terms imply the dynamic nature of the factors and 
processes that contribute to violent conflict, there is a great deal of debate about reducing conflict 
to one cause. 
As such, there is no generally accepted definition of regions, frontiers or regional border conflicts 
with commentators articulating a definition based on their own perspectives and areas of 
exploration. Two characteristics that are common across most studies are: 
• geographical proximity of the involved collective actors and  
• a certain amount of interaction – be they cooperative or confrontational.  
   
 
6 
According to this minimal definition of, a regional border conflict is a confrontational interaction 
between two or more collective actors within a particular geographical space (Ansorg, 2011). 
Typology of Conflict 
Territorial disputes are disagreement over tracts of land or water that are claimed by two or more 
independent countries. In such disputes, it is common that neighbouring states support or 
tolerate rebel groups on their territory. Several approaches in international relations and peace 
and conflict studies deal with regions and regional conflicts. Especially when it comes to 
explaining security and violence or interdependence between collective actors, the regional 
dimension serves as an analytical framework (Ansorg, 2011). Nevertheless, particular processes 
and phenomena have so far been inadequately theoretically described. Especially when it comes 
to the regional dynamics of militant violence, conventional theories neglect actions that take 
place outside the national or international level (Ansorg, 2011). 
Territorial disputes in Asia vary greatly in terms of their origins, the scope of the territory in 
question and the role these disputes play in the bilateral or multilateral relations of the states 
involved (Bukh, 2020). There are numerous ways territorial disputes can be categorised. Brunet-
Jailly (2015) present three categories of border disputes: territorial, positional and functional. 
According to this typology, territorial disputes are about land. They are the most complex ones as 
they undermine the integrity of states. Positional disputes arise when the parties agree in 
principle on a border but cannot agree on the position of the boundary line. Functional disputes 
are neither about territory nor the borderline but about competing understandings of the function 
that a certain border should perform. Bukh (2020) asserts that contestation over natural 
resources should be include in any typology of border dispute.  
Table 1: Types of Border Disputes 
Type Description Causes 
Territorial Disputes Conflicts between states or 
regions over the ownership of a 
given area. 
A country’s desire to increase its 
power. 
  A political need to divert attention from 
existing problems. 
  Claimed “rights” to an area based on 
history, ethnicity, or geography. 
Positional Disputes Conflicts over the interpretation of 
documents defining a boundary or 
the way it is shown on the ground. 
Boundary was drawn at a time when 
accuracy was not important.  
E.g. River boundaries (banks, 
navigable channel, centre, etc.) 
  Some groups not represented when 
boundary was created.  
   
 
7 
E.g. Colonial boundaries 
  Population increases or discovery of 
resources make accurate boundary 
important. 
Functional Disputes Conflicts over the national policies 
applied at a border. 
Immigration or customs regulations. 
E.g. Need for visas or papers to cross 
borders 
  Land use and location policies 
between neighbours.  
E.g. Locating landfills, or polluting 
industries near border 
Resource Disputes Conflicts over the use of 
resources created or complicated 
by a boundary. 
Resource straddles a border.  
E.g. River Basin, oil fields 
Source: Author’s own, data taken from Bukh, 2020: 340; Brunet-Jailly,2015 
Alternatively, disputes can be categorised by focusing on the factors that cause states to 
cooperate or to escalate territorial disputes (Fravel, 2008). One can also explore the role of 
power and levels of technology of the rival claimants, geopolitics (Emmers, 2009) and the role of 
non-state actors (Bukh, 2020) in understanding the diverging dynamics of such disputes (Bukh, 
2020). 
Parker (2006: 79) asserts that borders are the dividing lines between states, and boundaries are 
the ‘unspecific divides or separator that indicates limits of various kinds’. Boundaries can also 
thus be perceived as psychological, and operating in support of the idea of border. The role of 
mental barriers and its implications for the border are evident in the case of India and Pakistan 
and of particular salience in the escalation of conflicts when a sense of national ‘pride’ may be 
linked to a border dispute (Tripathi & Chaturvedi, 2019). 
When it comes to the origins of territorial disputes in Asia, historical claims of ownership are 
commonly referenced by parties in conflict (Bukh, 2020). However, rather than a history per se, 
factors such as colonialism and its legacies, the Cold War and domestic politics of one or more of 
the parties involved, are considered of importance in understanding conflicts origins and how 
they are inscribed by new meaning. Specific context matters to the evolution of boundary and 
territorial disputes with each case of territorial dispute having unique characteristics.  
Conflicts have become more complex and protracted, involving more non-state groups and 
regional and international actors (World Bank & United Nations, 2018). They are increasingly 
linked to global challenges such as climate change, natural disasters, cyber security and 
transnational organised crime (HM Government, 2015). The United Kingdom Government (HM 
Government, 2015) identified the following factors as likely to exert an influence on the nature 
and extent of violent conflict:  
• The increasing threat posed by terrorism, extremism and instability.  
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• The resurgence of state-based threats; and intensifying wider state competition.  
• The impact of technology, especially cyber threats; and wider technological 
developments.  
• The erosion of the rules-based international order, making it harder to build consensus 
and tackle global threats. 
Actors 
Regional conflict systems are often characterised by their complexity; involving numerous actors, 
causes, structural conditions and dynamics. Such complexity poses difficulties to those looking to 
undertake analysis of the regional dynamics of violence. It is still quite unclear how violence 
diffuses in regions and under which conditions a regional conflict system can emerge (Ansorg, 
2011). It can also be unclear who the key actors are in any given border dispute, how they 
engage with one another and the extent to which they influence the nature and extent of conflict. 
Border disputes are thus not simply waged between the armies of sovereign nation states, but 
expand to a multiplicity of transnational actors of violence and security that correlate in complex 
relations and often compete for political control and the monopoly of violence in a region. The 
regional conflict system that emerges can be thus be defined as a geographically determined 
area of insecurity, characterised by interdependent violent conflicts with a plurality of different 
sub-state, national or transnational actors (Ansorg, 2011). 
State Actors: Relations between nations are influenced by the actions of government. Cross-
border cooperation can mitigate conflict with parties benefiting from the dividends of co-
operation, financially, politically and socially. Correspondingly when countries adopt an 
antagonistic position in relation to border disputes, the threat of conflict and the breakdown of co-
operation become evident. It is clear that representatives of state authority including political 
parties and the military can exacerbate tensions through provocative actions i.e. the occupation 
of contested areas (see case study on Cambodia – Vietnam), the acquiescence of insurgent 
group activities (see claims by India and the reported operation of United Liberation Front of 
Assam from bases in Bangladesh) or the deployment of inflammatory language regarding 
regional tensions (the perceived support of the Indian government to the cross border Madheshi 
community).  
Non-State Actors: State actors might still be existent in these areas, but they are part of a larger 
conflict structure together with private, local and transnational actors of violence that take over 
the production of (in-) security in regions where the scope of public authority is limited. These 
private entrepreneurs of violence both exploit the population and demand money for protecting 
the people and their areas (Ansorg, 2011). Non-state actors may include cross border militant 
movements such as the United Liberation Front of Assam who have reportedly operated across 
the Indo-Bangladesh Border. This may problematise relations between nations when one party is 
viewed as allowing militants to operate with impunity.  
Ethno-linguistic and Religious Groups: Questions of identity should not be underestimated in 
the context of border disputes. The trans-border kinship of identity groups can lead to a regional 
spill over of violence, e.g. the Balkans during the 1990s (Fearon 1998). Moreover, refugee flows 
and the economic and political weakness of a conflict area, as after the genocide in Rwanda and 
the war in Burundi in the 1990s, can cause tensions in a wider region (Prunier 2009). In South 
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and Southeast Asia ethno-linguistic and religious conflict has spilled over borders. This includes 
Myanmar (Muslim vs Buddhist – targeted attacks on Rohingya groups); North East India 
(Bangladeshi migrants – disenfranchisement of Bangladeshis from electoral rolls); Nepal – India 
(Madheshi cross border communities contesting the constitution). Ethno-linguistic and religious 
groups can thus play a role in exacerbating or mitigating conflict. 
Private Security Actors: Alongside militant groups, private security firms have proliferated in 
recent years, playing a role in the protection of assets.  Indeed, symbols of regional authority or 
exemplars of influence or investment can become targets. One such example can be found in 
November 2018, when a group of assailants attempted to enter the Chinese consulate in 
Karachi. The attackers belonged to the Fidayeen Majeed Brigade—a China-focused cell recently 
established within the Balochistan Liberation Army (EFAS, 2018). Such attacks can prompt 
regional disputes but also escalate the deployment of private security to protect vulnerable 
assets. The attack sought to bring attention to the discrimination that the Baloch have faced at 
the hands of successive Pakistani regimes. This perception of unfairness has been noticeably 
aggravated with the proliferation of Chinese workers in the sparsely populated but gas and 
mineral-rich province of Balochistan, which forms a critical part of the China Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC).  
Serious Organised Criminal Groups: The scale of organised crime is difficult to estimate and 
depends on the definition that is used. Criminality may include trafficking in narcotics, people 
smuggling and human trafficking, trafficking of firearms, money laundering. While transnational 
organised crime affects every country in the world, the nature of illicit markets and their impact 
differs region to region. Southeast Asia is no exception, and while it is prosperous in-part due to 
expanding social exchanges, trade and investment in infrastructure, the region is also challenged 
by increasingly aggressive organised crime networks and syndicates. Threats arising from 
transnational organised crime in Southeast Asia are becoming more deeply integrated within the 
region itself, as well as with neighbouring and connected regions. At the same time, criminal 
networks operating in Southeast Asia have achieved global reach, trafficking unfathomable 
quantities of high-profit methamphetamine, consignments of wildlife and forest products, and an 
increasing range of counterfeit consumer and industrial goods (UNODC, 2019). They also 
continue to engage in the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons for the purposes of 
sexual and labour exploitation. 
Organised crime groups in Southeast Asia now wield unprecedented influence and control multi-
billion-dollar ‘industries’. Transnational organised crime syndicates use their financial power to 
corrupt and undermine the rule of law. Southeast Asia’s array of ethnic groups, linguistic, cultural 
and religious differences, and the region’s geographical characteristics of archipelagos and 
mountainous terrains present unique governance challenges. Moreover, the region consists of 
developed, developing and least-developed countries, which impedes the progress towards a 
common regional market, but also has strongly influenced the patterns of organised crime flows 
in the region. With different countries having varying capacities and resolve for monitoring and 
responding to transnational crime threats, organised criminal groups have been able to 
concentrate their operations in locations favourable to do business, typically those with lower 
capacity to implement and enforce robust countermeasures (UNODC, 2019). 
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Drivers of Conflict 
It is important to note that territorial or border disputes defy mono-causal explanations, involving 
a range of factors that may exert influence during a given period or not as the case may be. This 
may include a combination of material and/or cultural interests. In certain circumstances, needs 
for resources mix up with geopolitical rivalries and power relations between neighbours 
(Goodhand, 2018). In other cases, nationalist ideologies can add up to economic interests. 
However, territorial disputes have been typically explained in terms of power relations (Mancini, 
2013). 
A number of theoretical positions have been mobilised to explain conflict. Realist theory suggests 
that changing power relations usually result in increasing conflict over territorial control, a 
worrying conclusion in today’s Asia given the growing power of China (a country with a growingly 
assertive posture toward territorial claims), India, and the relevance of regional middle powers, 
such as Indonesia and Vietnam (Mancini, 2013). 
Normative explanations refer to subjectively-formed norms, conceptions of justice, and beliefs 
that can motivate territorial claims and trigger conflict over disputed territories. According to this 
approach, the value of territory not only derives from political or economic interests, but also 
serves as source of sovereignty and identity both for the states and the people involved (Mancini, 
2013). In the framework of this normative explanation, cultural differences should also be 
considered. National histories and nationalistic sentiments clearly play a role in the disputes over 
Kashmir between India and Pakistan, over the political status of Taiwan and Tibet, and over the 
South China Sea, in which China has domestically played the card of nationalism, with selective 
use of history in textbooks and in the media in order to emphasise what typically is referred to as 
“the need to re-establish national honour” (Mancini, 2013). 
In Asia, the current territorial disputes might escalate to armed conflict mainly due to three 
factors: geopolitical shifts, competition over scarce natural resources (e.g., oil, gas, and in 
particular, water), and environmental degradation (Mancini, 2013). These broad categories 
intersect and incorporate an array of sub categories. 
Geopolitics 
In a changing geopolitical environment, territorial claims might assume new relevance in 
asserting the primacy of emerging powers. A mix of political, economic, and cultural motives, 
combined with a more nationalist reading of sovereignty can trigger confrontations over 
contested territories (Van Houtum, 2005, Mancini, 2013). Border conflicts intersect with 
geopolitics in significant and multifaceted ways. Indeed, the South Asian region is not immune to 
global shifts in power competition, especially involving China, India and the United States. This is 
clear in the disputes in the South China Seas. This has seen an increasingly assertive China 
assert its position against overlapping claims of Southeast Asian countries.  
A fundamental shift in the attitudes of regional states can occur if China adopts aggressive 
policies i.e. towards India and the East Asian neighbours in an effort to assert its primacy in the 
Asia-Pacific region and pushes the United States to actively create balance of power coalitions to 
contain Chinese power and security threats (Rajagopalan, 2017).  
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The South and Southeast Asia region has experienced significant globalisation in terms of extra-
regional trade and economic relations, although intra-regional economic interactions still remain 
low. Given renewed focus on regional integration (see for example India’s Act East Policy and 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative) Smaller South and Southeast Asian countries have been active 
in developing trade links with economic and military powers who operate in the region (namely 
China, U.S.A, India and Japan etc.) (Paul, 2018). Such developing connection provide both 
opportunities and pitfalls for actors within the region to forge connections. 
Many regional powers are actively involved in complex bargaining process to gain economic 
assistance from key states in the region, China and India in particular. Yet, they also have been 
able to muster considerable economic support from both without forming military coalitions with 
either. The two rising powers are motivated by the fear of the smaller states joining in a coalition 
with their opponent in the future, but do not want to fully abandon burgeoning economic links 
between each other by upsetting the regional order too drastically. As a preventive strategy, the 
two rising powers attempt to outbid in giving economic concessions to the smaller states in the 
region (with China having an advantage given its deep pockets) often without a tangible results in 
return. As Xingi (2017) contends, the new order has offered smaller states ‘room to manoeuvre’ 
and ‘upwards mobility’, although it needs to be seen how far this trend can continue. This ‘power 
of the weak’ obviously has limitations, but has worked thus far to their advantage. For example, 
Myanmar and the stabilisation of its conflicts are crucial to China’s geostrategic interests, as they 
occur in the territories of major Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects, where two of its economic 
corridors pass. 
Global or national rends can thus exert a significant influence on border disputes, As Paul (2017) 
asserts a sudden economic decline or downturn of China may encourage the regime to 
consolidate its economic position by competing more aggressively in the military arena. 
Conversely, US economic sanctions may generate nationalism among the Chinese public and 
the elite. Finally, nationalist forces could overrun the pragmatism that characterised the Chinese 
policy thus far. 
Commentators such as Cotillon (2017) and Hughes (2011) have highlighted that expressions of 
nationalism have merged with geopolitical thinking. “Geopolitik” nationalism likens the state to a 
living organism that requires geopolitical space of its own in order to develop and function. This 
approach sees national interest, and therefore nationalism, as being characterised by the 
territorialisation of space (Hughes 2011: 620; Cotillon, 2017). 
Resource competition 
Competition over scarce natural resources can trigger conflict over contested territories. 
Continuing economic development and demographic expansion in Asia are fostering domestic 
demands for resources and control over them in disputed areas. Such competition can become a 
matter of survival (Mancini, 2013). This is not only evident in the need for more energy, which is 
intensifying the disputes in the South China Sea, but also in the need for water for agricultural 
use, which today absorbs 70% of water usage in the region (IWMI, 2007; Mancini, 2013: 7). 
Research suggests a relationship between countries sharing water and incidence of conflict and, 
in particular, that countries upstream of a river have a significant risk of conflict with countries 
downstream of the same watercourse. However, history also suggests that most of these 
territorial disputes did not lead to armed conflict, but rather to negotiated settlements (e.g. the 
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Bangladeshi-Indian dispute over the quantity of Ganges water to be released for Bangladeshi 
utilisation during the dry season). However, this non-violent trend can change in the future, if 
overpopulation, economic growth, and environmental degradation aggravated by changing 
climate patterns put further pressure on water sources (Mancini, 2013; Goodhand, 2018).  
Population and economic growth may lead countries to compete over resources causing a flare-
up of dormant territorial disputes. The South China Sea provides a case in point, being at the 
centre of competition driven by economic interests and prospects of access to energy resources 
(see section on South China Sea Conflict). Tensions and conflicts over water use are 
increasingly common, as a result of both high water scarcity and high water demand. The use of 
water resources generates political disputes between countries sharing waters within their 
borders (Levy & Sidel, 2011). 
Environmental Issues 
Climate change has a complex and multifaceted impact on border conflicts and territorial 
disputes, intersecting and exacerbating existing contestations over natural resources. 
Environmental degradation due to industrialisation and aggravated by climate change may 
exasperate the scarcity of resources. Pollution, rising sea levels, and dry rivers are all major 
concerns in the region that can hamper economic development and political relations (Mancini, 
2013).  
The UNDP (2012) Human Development Report commented that climate change was fuelling 
resource-based conflict across Asia. The report noted that East Asia is likely to experience 
increased precipitation and temperatures associated with climate change. It’s also particularly 
exposed to natural disasters both in terms of its geographic makeup and also number of people 
affected. This stands to be further affected by land-use change and deforestation (UNDP, 2012: 
35). With regards to South Asia, the report notes that river water in South Asia supplies both 
downstream and upstream countries and has increasingly become a political issue with 
increased tensions of water supplies. Due to climate change, Himalayan glaciers, which supply 
water to several of South Asia's most crucial rivers, are retreating. Because of the dependency of 
the rivers which draw their water from the glaciers, disrupted water supplies to the rivers could 
have widespread consequences for the sub region and its populations (UNDP, 2012: 39-40). 
Conflict can also arise over sewage dumping or water pollution in contested areas, flaring up 
disputes over rivers and shore control. Pollution, for example, has been a matter of contention 
over the control of the Mekong River, whose waters cross China, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. However, the existence of the Mekong River Commission (1995), albeit 
imperfect since upper riparian countries (China and Myanmar) are not partners in the initiative, 
has allowed joint management of water-related issues. ASEAN membership has also been a 
positive factor in reducing tensions over issues such as transnational water pollution (Mancini, 
2013:.8-9)  
Other Factors 
Serious Organised Crime (SOC) has emerged as a factor that can exacerbate violent conflict and 
state fragility (UNODC, 2019). It can also have a significant destabilising impact on peacebuilding 
and state building (UNODC, 2019). The UK Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) paper 
(UK Government 2011: 4) comments, “when violent conflict breaks out, the costs to the country 
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and the international community are enormous. Lives are lost, people displaced, trade links cut, 
and organised crime groups or terrorists are given an opportunity to take root, exacerbating 
instability”. 
Criminal networks and activities fuel violent conflict, finance terrorists and militias, and complicate 
conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction (Global Initiative Against Transnational 
Organized Crime, 2017). It is reported that Illicit networks often thrive in conflict-affected and 
post-conflict states by taking advantage of illicit opportunities to entrench their economic, political 
and social influence through corruption, rent-seeking, predation and criminal governance (Global 
Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017). Others comment that conflict affected 
regions represent a high cost arena within which to operate with organised criminal groups 
preferring to operate in more stable and less politicised borderlands, less organised criminal 
groups may proliferate in other areas. It is broadly accepted that the threat from external actors 
such as transnational armed groups and organised crime gangs is increasing (UNODC, 2019).  
The interconnections between illicit flows and conflict zones is often a feature of geography: the 
locality of production, transit and consequences for state peripheries.  The geography of illicit 
flows is often also a facet of central or peripheral conflicts and different forms of institutional or 
state control in these areas. The ability of the state to project into the hinterlands, the presence or 
traversing of illicit flows, and certain geographic features such as archipelagos or small islands 
which make surveillance difficult, can become targets for control by criminal or violent groups as 
provide an easy source of rents (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017). 
Weigand (2020) provides an analysis of four conflict-affected border areas: the Thailand-
Malaysia border, the Myanmar-China border, the Myanmar-Bangladesh border and the 
(maritime) Indonesia-Philippines-Malaysia border. In each he investigates how different forms of 
smuggling in the area interact with the armed conflict, be it licit (petrol, rice, coffee) or illicit goods 
(drugs, arms, people). Critically, Weigand highlights the issue of state involvement in illicit 
markets, thereby challenging binaries of state and organised crime, a theme picked up in the 
Bangladesh-Myanmar case study. The terms licit and illicit merely obscure complex phenomena: 
among them, ‘the crimes committed by state authorities’ 
Notwithstanding increasing levels of concern among national governments and international 
organisations with respect to the links between organised crime and conflict, much remains to be 
understood about the nature, extent and implications of the connectivity between the two.  
3. Case Studies 
In South and Southeast Asia, borders remain an issue of high politics often defining the contours 
of relations between the states in the region. Borders across the region have historically been 
‘soft’ and ‘porous’ (Goodhand, 2018). Analysis of regional security and conflict in South and 
Southeast Asia requires a deeper understanding of the nature of border disputes and conflicts. 
In Asia, geopolitical shifts, natural resources, and environmental degradation are a source of 
concern (Mancini, 2013). The South China Seas represent an area where a confluence of issues 
manifest and represent a particular flashpoint that could lead to confrontations for the region and 
beyond (Mancini, 2013). At the same time, the continuing trend toward integration in the region, 
the growing relevance of regional institutions (ASEAN etc.) and arrangements, and the 
   
 
14 
processes of democratisation are reasons to be optimistic about peaceful settlements of 
territorial disputes in (Nathan, 2010). 
Crosscutting many border conflicts in the region are the legacies of colonialism with the 
demarcation of borders by colonial powers often ignoring ethnic and linguistic lineages of the 
local populace and defined historically by convenience, power sharing agreements and treaties 
(Mishra, 2016). 
The list of disputes presented in the following section should be considered illustrative rather 
than exhaustive, selected to provide an insight into the multifaceted drivers of conflict. They are 
selected to highlight how relatively localised disputes can become global in scope as they 
intersect with global contestations over political or economic power, are inflamed by political 
actors keen to exploit grievances or exacerbated by resource scarcity. Many of the disputes 
examined below can be traced to the process of decolonisation and various regional and 
domestic struggles, subsequently being absorbed by the Cold War. Despite the end of the Cold 
War and the drastic regional and global transformations that followed, these disputes continue to 
play an important role in the relations with each other and beyond. Indeed historical contestations 
continue to be inscribed with new meaning as circumstances evolve. 
Thailand / Cambodia Dispute(s) 
Thailand and Cambodia have a number of border demarcation issues but the most important 
dispute between the two countries has been over an area of land of approximately 4.6 sq. km 
which surrounds the Hindu temple of Preah Vihear (Thai name Phra Viharn). This dispute has 
led to various military clashes. The temple is situated on top of a cliff in the Dangrek/Donrak 
mountain range located in Cambodia’s Preah Vihear province and claimed by Thailand as part of 
its Sisaket Province. The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (2012) assert that the conflict is 
driven by sentiments of national identity and sovereignty issues. 
In 1954, Thai troops occupied the temple and tensions between the two countries persisted until 
the dispute was referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1959. In 1962 an ICJ ruling 
awarded ownership of the temple to Cambodia. The dispute reignited in 2008, after the World 
Heritage Committee listed the temple as a UNESCO World Heritage site despite objections from 
Thailand (Wagener, 2011).  
In April 2011, Cambodia filed an application to the ICJ requesting a reinterpretation of its 1962 
judgment and a request for an order for provisional measures. Cambodia argued that the 1962 
judgment granted sovereignty over the temple and its vicinity to Cambodia. The Thai submission 
to the ICJ, in response to Cambodia’s claims, argued that the ongoing dispute was not over the 
ownership of the temple subject to the 1962 ruling but a new boundary dispute over the 4.6 sq. 
km surrounding the temple (Bukh, 2020). 
The Thai irredentist narrative that became influential in 2008 and beyond, located the dispute 
within the broader discourse on the territories Thailand lost to the British and French colonial 
powers in the late 19th and early 20th century. As such it may seem that colonialism and, more 
specifically, the legacies of colonial powers’ policies in Southeast Asia, are the main cause of this 
dispute (Bukh, 2020).  
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While the present dispute between Thailand and Cambodia does have its roots in the colonial 
period of the region, the most important factor that led to the escalation of the dispute in 2008 
and the subsequent clashes was domestic politics in Thailand. At that time, the issue was 
reignited and politicised in Thailand in the context of the domestic struggle between the so-called 
‘royalists’ on one side and the supporters of the former Prime Minister Taksin Shinawatra on the 
other (Bukh, 2020). It is thus apparent that border disputes can become pawns in domestic 
politics i.e. demonstrations of power to local audience or evidence of nationalist credentials.  
Vietnam / Cambodia Territorial Dispute 
Violence along Vietnam Cambodia border highlight that, conflict can emerge in areas that had 
hitherto been considered settled. The Moc Bai – Ba Vet border issue was considered resolved in 
2006 following an agreement between the two nations’ prime ministers. The demarcation of the 
1,200 km long border was due to be completed in 2012, but 20% of it remains unmarked 
(Cotillon, 2017).  
In recent years, tensions on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border have begun to flare up again as 
anti-Vietnamese nationalism and a perceived Vietnamese threat begins to regain momentum. In 
2009, Sam Rainsy, the leader of the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), 
allegedly encouraged villagers to uproot border markers in Svay Rieng province, flaring up 
tensions and causing violent clashes between Vietnamese and Cambodian civilians (Cotillon, 
2015).  
In June 2015, tensions culminated into violent clashes on the Vietnamese-Cambodian border. 
This incident was precipitated by CNRP lawmakers Real Camerin and Sam An who led around 
250 Cambodian activists armed with sticks into Vietnamese territory. They were met by 
Vietnamese security officers and local residents who tried to prevent them from trespassing. The 
altercation soon escalated into violent clashes between the two groups and dozens of 
Vietnamese and Cambodian nationals were injured (Cotillion, 2017). Here again the intersection 
of domestic political narratives inscribe regional conflict, at times being utilised by vested local 
interests. Given the sensitivity of border regions, such conflicts can impact on national 
cooperation and sow the seeds of discord.  
India / Pakistan Dispute(s) - Jammu and Kashmir  
India and Pakistan have a number of territorial disputes but the most important one is over 
Kashmir. One-third of Kashmir is under Pakistani administration and two-thirds are controlled by 
India. With a combined population of over 17.5 million (Bukh, 2020) and a total territory of over 
300,000 sq. km it is the largest territorial dispute in the world in terms of the size of the disputed 
territory and the population that inhabits it. 
The dispute over Kashmir has led to countless deaths and is a major source of conflict between 
two nuclear powers, playing an important role not only in regional relations but also, in various 
ways, in the policies of major powers such as the United States, China and Russia (Bukh, 2020). 
At the same time, the origins can be traced to the legacy of the British colonial rule in India and 
the nature of the British departure from the Indian subcontinent in 1947–8. 
Border skirmishes resulting in loss of life of both soldiers and civilians are frequent. Between 
2004 and 2007, the two governments held talks to establish a framework for the resolution of the 
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dispute, but the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks interrupted this process. Both governments 
officially claim all of Kashmir. However, Pakistan came to recognise the existence of a movement 
for independence in the valley of Kashmir and the improbability of inclusion of all of Kashmir 
within its borders. Likewise it seems that India does not expect to include the areas of Kashmir 
under Pakistani control in its territory. Despite these important changes in the two countries’ 
positions, the prospects for resolution of the dispute in the foreseeable future are dim (Blarel and 
Ebert, 2015; Bukh, 2020). 
Tensions in the Indo-Pak border can also be exacerbated be competition over resources, for 
example, tensions between India and Pakistan have risen from over the Baglihar dam 
construction over River Chenab in Indian-administered Kashmir. Historically water war has been 
prevented via the Indus Waters Treaty signed in 1960 between India and Pakistan, which gives 
the former exclusive rights to the waters of the Eastern Rivers until the point they flow into 
Pakistan, with the latter granted exclusive rights to the Western Rivers. India has always held the 
upper hand over the Indus, however, given it controls upstream flow, leaving Pakistan vulnerable 
to India’s whims (Bukh, 2020). 
As noted by (Werleman, 2020), the United Nations has already defined Pakistan as a “water 
scarce” country, impacted by climate change reduced rainfall patterns. India’s exertion of control 
over Kashmir, and reduced water flow as a result of hydroelectricity projects, could spur major 
conflict between India and Pakistan in the not too distant future. Projections suggest that by the 
year 2050, water accessibility for human consumption will have dropped by 40 percent, 
potentially leading to water based conflict. 
India / China Dispute(s) 
China and India share the world’s longest unmarked border. The territorial dispute between the 
two countries over territory in Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Aksai Chin is approximately 
38,000 sq. km in size and is mostly uninhabited. It is controlled by China as part of its Xinjiang 
Autonomous Region and is claimed by India as part of Jammu and Kashmir. Arunachal Pradesh, 
referred to as South Tibet in China, is a state in the north eastern part of India with a population 
of about 1.2 million. China claims approximately 90,000 sq. km in the eastern section of the 
border which more or less corresponds to the territory of Arunachal Pradesh (Brunet-Jailly ed., 
2015). 
The dispute over Aksai Chin relates to the Indo–Pakistani dispute over Kashmir discussed in the 
previous case study. When the British ended their rule in the subcontinent, there was no 
demarcated border in Kashmir. In the years that followed India’s independence, Indian 
governmental documents had depicted the border between India and China in this region as 
‘undefined’. China came into possession of this territory when it occupied Tibet in 1951. It was 
only in 1953 that India made claims to Aksai Chin based on the boundary of pre-colonial Dogra 
rulers of Kashmir (Brunet-Jailly ed., 2015). In 1986–7, tensions escalated in the Arunachal 
Pradesh area with countries expanding their military presence. 
Contemporary India / Chinese relationship are largely cordial and a key factors in regional 
stability. After the 1987 incident, relations between the two Asian giants transformed into a cold 
peace and while both sides officially maintain their territorial claims, whilst accepting the status 
quo. Sporadic conflict continues to erupt in the Indo-China region. Since 5 May 2020, Chinese 
and Indian troops have engaged in aggressive melee, face-offs and skirmishes at locations along 
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the Sino-Indian border, including near the disputed Pangong Lake in Ladakh and the Tibet 
Autonomous Region, and near the border between Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region. 
Additional clashes also took place at locations in eastern Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control 
(LAC). 
Nepal / India Dispute 
In South Asia, the movement of people and goods across borders is strictly controlled by states. 
However, there are some exceptions. India and Nepal’s border is mostly peaceful and porous 
with minimal restrictions on the movement of goods and people. In 2014 India’s current Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi visited Nepal, a move significant for India–Nepal relations. The tour of 
Modi energised the India–Nepal ties with the signing of several important agreements. India 
offered a soft line of credit amounting to US$1 billion for the execution of infrastructure and 
development projects (Tripathi, 2019).  
Despite predominantly cordial relations there are times when border issues have taken a critical 
turn. One such recent border-related problem between India and Nepal was witnessed during the 
Madheshi movement. In 2015, an agitating section of the Madheshi community in Nepal blocked 
the India–Nepal border. Due to the sociocultural proximity of Madheshi community with India, the 
blockade of the Indo-Nepal border has had repercussions for bilateral ties (Tripathi, 2019).   
Madhesh is a lowland region of Southern Nepal that shares border with India. The Madheshi 
community predominantly resides in the border region between India and Nepal. This community 
has a close relationship with the people of north India. Trouble escalated in the region when 
disgruntled leaders of the community declared disagreements with Nepal’s new constitution 
(Haviland, 2015). The geographical and social proximity with the Madheshi community led India 
to raise the alarm at this juncture, expressing apprehension of spill over of disturbances to the 
Indian side. India attempted to convey its concern to Nepal about the imminent outbursts of the 
Madheshi community (Tripathi, 2019). 
The Nepali government refused to acknowledge the demands of the agitators and the situation 
deteriorated. Intensifying the agitation, protestors in Madhesh blocked the India–Nepal border in 
September 2015. As a landlocked country, hugely dependent on India for its international trade 
transit, the blockade disrupted not only the big and small businesses but also the daily lives of 
ordinary people in Nepal. Nepal accused India of facilitating this unrest by implicitly supporting 
the Madheshi community in the blockade. The Nepali government termed this standoff as 
‘unofficial blockade by India’. This blockade created fissures in the Nepali polity. It also impacted 
India’s image in Nepal.  
It has also taken a geopolitical dimension and reflective of completion between China and India. 
Indeed, if China is seen to invest in Nepal, it is also interpreted as an anti-India investment. In 
general, there is a lack of positive discourse on India–Nepal relations. Normalcy returned after 
the end of the blockade. Although officially the border between Indian and Nepal remains the 
same, perceptions have changed. Tripathi (2019) asserts that there is now a new mental border 
between the two countries. Moreover, the missing security concern in relation to the India–Nepal 
border is no longer valid. The larger South Asian border politics that is characterised by security 
dilemma is now also applicable to the India–Nepal border.  
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Bangladesh / India Dispute(s) 
The India–Bangladesh border is the fifth largest land border in the world measuring circa 4096.7 
km. The India–Bangladesh border is viewed as a ‘security concern’ by New Delhi, and has 
sought to securitise the border with Bangladesh viewing with concern the porous nature of the 
border making it accessible to the militant groups and smugglers (Lakshman & Jha, n.d.).  
Commenting more broadly on the North-Eastern border regions, Lakshman and Jha (n.d.) note 
that the perception of terrorist infrastructure in safe havens across borders; the growth and 
internationalisation of organised criminal syndicates with powerful political influence and 
patronage; and a perceived strengthening network of institutions for the communal mobilisation 
of the migrants – particularly through a growing complex of madrassas (seminaries) – are among 
the trends along the India-Bangladesh border that are seen to exacerbate tension. These 
problems are further compounded by non-linear boundaries, borders that are poorly delimited, 
and intermingled ethnic groups along both sides of the border. The length of the border, difficult 
terrain and harsh climatic conditions present unique monitoring challenges in the region. The 
seamlessness of the movement of migrants, as Hazarika argues, gives it a critical, even 
dangerous, edge especially as such movements take place in an area already troubled by 
insurgencies (Baruah, 2007). 
Whilst this report focuses on cross ‘national border tensions, conflict is also evident within 
national borders but across sub-national lines. This too has the potential to spill over into regional 
conflict when ethnic, linguistic or religious bonds traverse such boundaries (Baruah, 2007). 
Bangladesh / Myanmar Dispute(s) 
The influence of geopolitics is evident in border disputes between Myanmar and Bangladesh. 
Myanmar occupies a strategic location bordering China and India, and connected with the Indian 
Ocean through the Bay of Bengal. It is the only land transportation hub connecting East Asia, 
Southeast Asia, and South Asia. Its location of geo-strategic importance has made it the focus of 
interests for the world’s major powers such as China, Japan, the United States, India, and the 
European Union (Ahmad, 2017; Dai & Hongchao, 2014). 
Both China and India are using Myanmar’s ports in the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, for 
exports and imports. They have also invested significantly in development projects including oil, 
gas, electricity, regional connectivity, and special economic zones in Rakhine state. 
Relationships between Bangladesh and Myanmar in contrast are less cordial, having not 
benefited significantly from Myanmar’s natural resources, strategic location, and trade and 
investments.  
Myanmar is a neighbouring country of Bangladesh with a long border. It has huge natural 
resources such as oil, gas, forestry, fisheries, agricultural land and other mineral resources. 
There has been a long dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar regarding the maritime 
boundary demarcation. The dispute is about the demarcation of the territorial waters, continental 
shelves, and exclusive economic zones of both Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal. 
On 14th march 2012, the Law of the Sea Tribunal (ITLOS) delivered a judgment on delimitation 
of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar. This judgment marked a 
distinctive legal success for Bangladesh. After the tribunal’s verdict, Bangladesh is be able to 
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explore oil and gas in the Bay of Bengal, where a huge amount of reserves are expected to be in 
existence (Ahamed et al. 2020). 
Criminality has also emerged as a significant issue in the region with Myanmar emerging as a 
significant hub for the production and distribution of methamphetamine and its derivatives. 
Ahamed et al (2020) assert that significant numbers are involved in this illicit trade in border 
regions. Yaaba - a mixture of methamphetamine and caffeine – has emerged as a particular 
issue in areas of Bangladesh including Cox’s Bazar. Trade in this cheap drug has also spread to 
Chittagong and Dhaka cities. 
Given the value of this drug trade, law enforcement bodies have become implicated with some 
asserting that law enforcement agencies are the main perpetrators and beneficiaries of the 
yaaba trade in Bangladesh. They continue that the police force are involved in kidnapping, cross-
firing, persecution, and filing of false cases against many innocent people, and yaaba is used as 
a tool through which they can easily demand ransom (Alam, 2018). 
National ethnic conflict within Myanmar also has a cross border dimension with the Arakan 
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) reported to be operating out of and recruiting Rohingyas from 
refugee camps (Alam, 2018). Such localised conflict between ARSA and Myanmar can also 
become globalised as militant groups forge links. It is reported that Al-Qaeda in the sub-continent 
issued a declaration where they invited Bangladesh’s Muslims to provide support to the 
Rohingyas. It is not clear whether the Al-Qaeda has a link with ARSA or not. Nevertheless, 
extremist networks in Bangladesh and Myanmar exist through which the ARSA, and Buddhists 
extremist are gaining influence in the region (Alam, 2018) 
South China Sea Maritime Disputes 
The territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea are considered some of the most 
complex conflicts in the region if not worldwide (Bukh, 2020). The disputed areas are abundant in 
natural resources such as gas and oil and also carry strategic importance, as roughly half of the 
world’s commercial shipping passes through them. These disputes play an important role not 
only in the relations among the claimants but also the foreign policies of countries such as Japan 
and the United States. The disputes involve overlapping maritime, territorial and fishing rights 
and claims by China, Taiwan, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia (CSIS, 
2015). 
The South China Sea is one of the largest fishing grounds in the world with rich biological 
diversity, and access to fisheries plays an important role in the dispute among the Chinese 
provinces bordering the South China Sea, Hainan and Guangdong, Vietnam, and the Philippines 
(CSIS, 2015). The sea accounts for approximately 10 per cent of the annual global fisheries 
catch, making it extremely important to the fishing industries of nearby countries. 
At the same time, the growing demand for energy resources, particularly oil and gas, to support 
China’s development and Beijing’s desire to reduce its dependency on Middle Eastern oil, are 
the main reasons why China is unwilling to compromise over its territorial claims (Bukh, 2020; 
CSIS, 2015). However, because of the tensions, the majority of hydrocarbon estimates in areas 
such as the Spratly Islands remain unproven. 
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The South China Sea also occupies a significant geostrategic position in terms of international 
shipping. The majority of energy shipments and raw materials that pass through the Malacca 
Straits continue on through the South China Sea to countries such as China and Japan. The 
Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has recognised the strategic importance of the 
sea, and has taken steps to bolster its capabilities within the region. The U.S. also has an 
interest in protecting the sea lanes that run through the area, as it considers open and stable 
maritime commons as essential to international trade and prosperity. 
China, Vietnam and the Philippines have made the most significant and forceful claims of 
sovereignty in the South China Sea. The former’s claim to the Spratly Islands may have far-
reaching consequences if it intends to claim full exclusive economic zones (EEZs) around those 
islands, which would overlap significantly with the EEZs claimed by the Philippines, Brunei, 
Malaysia and Vietnam (Morton, 2016). While Beijing may seek to pursue this goal, it may also be 
thinking of demanding “historical rights” other parts of the sea within the nine-dashed line (Bukh, 
2020). The uncertainty as to what China’s legal claims are, and apparent attempts to enforce 
sovereignty in areas that are too far away from its coasts to be part of its EEZ, has put it at odds 
with other claimants given that many of these areas are far closer to the coastlines of other 
claimants. 
Chinese domestic politics also plays a role in stoking conflict in the region. In particular, 
competing mandates and lack of coordination among Chinese government agencies, many of 
which strive to increase their power and budget, have exacerbated tensions in the South China 
Sea. For example, the Chinese navy has used maritime tensions to justify its modernisation, and 
nationalist sentiment around territorial claims, further compound the problem.  
A more immediate conflict risk lies in the growing number of law enforcement and paramilitary 
vessels playing an increasing role in disputed territories without a clear legal framework. They 
have been involved in most of the recent incidents, including the prolonged standoff between 
China and the Philippines in April 2012 in Scarborough Reef.  
Geopolitics plays a particular role in the simmering conflicts in the south China sea. In 2010, 
Hillary Clinton re-affirmed that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was a U.S. national 
interest, and more recently Donald Trump has pursued an explicitly antagonistic policy towards 
China. Commentators highlight that China sees ASEAN countries using the U.S. as a hedge to 
counter-balance its growing power, and Washington has been using them to expand its regional 
presence (CSIS, 2015; Bukh, 2020). 
Bukh (2020) comments that the Chinese government practises a synchronised strategy to 
enhance its power in the region on the one hand and on the other hand, tries to keep the extra-
regional powers at bay. Simultaneously, in an order to ensure dominance over the region, China 
tries to divide the ASEAN members on the South China Sea issue by appealing to economically 
weaker countries like Cambodia The territorial disputes involving Cambodia on the one hand and 
other ASEAN members on the other hand further instigate Phnom Penh to accept China’s 
regional actions, even at the cost of a disintegrated ASEAN. In response, Kizekova and Gerstl 
(2017) highlight that ASEAN follows the path of multitrack diplomacy and engaging China with 
the regional institutionalism initiatives to avoid further escalation of tensions in the region.  
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Sino-Vietnamese territorial dispute 
Vietnam’s maritime territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea has been ongoing since 
1974, when Vietnam accused China of the opportunistic takeover of the Paracel Islands (Path 
2011: 190). The Sino-Vietnamese territorial dispute in the South China Sea is concentrated 
around two archipelagos: the Paracel and Spratly. In 2009, China submitted a United Nations 
(UN) Note Verbale in response to the one jointly submitted by Vietnam and Malaysia protesting 
China’s claims. China’s UN Note Verbale stated that it possesses “indisputable sovereignty over 
the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereignty rights and 
jurisdiction over the relevant water as well as subsoil thereof” (UN 2009).  
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